Jordan MacKenzie: "Self-Deception as Self-Defeat"

  • Date: –13:00
  • Location: Engelska parken - Eng2-1022
  • Organiser: Department of Philosophy
  • Contact person: Erik Carlson
  • Seminarium

The Higher Seminar in Practical Philosophy

Jordan MacKenzie, New York University: "Self-Deception as Self-Defeat"


Abstract
What’s so bad about being self-deceived? Historically, this question has been answered with an appeal to consequences: self-deception, it has been argued, corrupts our moral characters and leads to bad moral outcomes. In this paper, I show that self-deception is a morally undesirable epistemic state for other reasons. Specifically, according to the “Self-Deception as Self-Defeat Account”, self-deception is morally undesirable because of the particular relationship that it bears to our values. Self-deception is motivated by what we value on the one hand, while on the other hand serving as the particular means through which we end up distorting and disrespecting those same values. Given that we, as valuers, have moral reason to be concerned with what we value and how we value it, we are thus justified in viewing self-deception as a morally undesirable, and condemnable, epistemic state