Nikolaj Pedersen: "Non-evidentialist epistemology, closure, and the question of unity"
- Date: –12:00
- Location: Seminar through Zoom (contact Matti Eklund for link and details)
- Organiser: Department of Philosophy
- Contact person: Matti Eklund
The Higher Seminar in Theoretical Philosophy
Nikolaj Pedersen, UIC, Yonsei University: "Non-evidentialist epistemology, closure, and the question of unity"
This paper discusses two recent concessive, non-evidentialist responses to scepticism: Crispin Wright’s idea of epistemic entitlement and Annalisa Coliva’s idea of extended rationality. Wright and Coliva’s approaches to scepticism are concessive in the sense that they grant the sceptic that there is—and could be—no such thing as possession of evidence to accept anti-sceptical hypotheses (I’m not a brain in a vat; I’m not having a lucid, coherent dream, etc.). However, in order to block scepticism both Wright and Coliva buy into the idea that some positive epistemic standings are not tied to evidence and that anti-sceptical hypotheses can enjoy such standings. In this sense they are non-evidentialist responses. I argue that Wright and Coliva are committed to a form of epistemic pluralism and I present a cluster of issues that emerges as a result of this commitment. In particular, I argue that they may have to rethink the nature of closure.