Andrew Reisner: "Why None of Fittingness, Reasons, or Value Is First"
- Datum: –12.00
- Plats: Seminarium via Zoom (ID 644 918 379 72)
- Arrangör: Filosofiska institutionen
- Kontaktperson: Eric Carlson
Högre seminariet i praktisk filosofi
Andrew Reisner, Uppsala universitet: "Why None of Fittingness, Reasons, or Value Is First"
Seminarium via Zoom, anslut via den här länken eller mötets ID 644 918 379 72
This is a very drafty draft of a chapter of my book project, The Pragmatic Foundations of Theoretical Reason. It is not obviously related to the topic, but it is important for building the ontology of non-descriptive properties I intend to use. In this chapter, I (attempt to) argue that no x-first view is correct, because the variance conditions for value are at least different from those for reasons. Fittingness may share the same variance conditions as either value or reasons, but not both. I argue that treating any one of value, reasons, or fittingness as basic and the others as derived means that at least one of the necessary analyses will either over-generate or under-generate.